John C. Eastman is the Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community Service at Chapman University School of Law, where he was dean from 2007 to 2010 before stepping down to pursue a bid for California Attorney General. He is the founding director of the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, a public interest law firm affiliated with the Claremont Institute. Before entering the academy, he was a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Fourth Circuit Judge J. Michal Luttig, the director of congressional and public affairs at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and an attorney with the national law firm of Kirkland & Ellis. A nationally recognized expert in constitutional law, Eastman has published extensively, including as co-author of a major constitutional law textbook, and has participated in over 60 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. He is chairman of the board of the National Organization for Marriage.
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A constitutional right to marry persons of the same sex [ ] exists nowhere in the text of the Constitution or in the history and traditions of the American people.
The National Constitution Centers Jeffery Rosen is joined by John Eastman and Paul M. Smith to break down the historic arguments about same-sex marriage in the Supreme Court this week.
On April 28, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges. John Eastman discusses the case.
More than fifty million people have, by their votes, demonstrated that they continue to understand the profound importance of marriage. They deserve better than to have the decision to protect or redefine marriage taken out of their hands by the Supreme Court.
The US Supreme Court has set a precedent upholding the right of states to define marriage as the union of husband and wife. All federal and state judgesincluding those in Alabamaare bound by that precedent.
Courts throughout the centuries have recognized the central role of traditional marriage in procreation, child-rearing, and society, rebutting any claim that the governments interest in furthering the institution of traditional marriage is unsupported by a compelling interest, much less by a rational basis.
Properly understood, neither [Due Process nor Equal Protection] supports a ruling that traditional marriage is unconstitutional.
The Equal Protection Clause does not compel recognition of same-sex marriages because same-sex couples are not situated similarly, in relevant respects, to opposite-sex couples. Moreover, policies recognizing only traditional marriage further society's compelling interests in procreation and child-rearing, among other things.